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Revenue Ruling 78-401: The Retained Control Test
of Section 302(b)(1)
JOHN

L.

RUPPERT*

One of the questions remaining unanswered after United
States v. Davis is whether loss of control over corporate acts
requiring supermajority stockholder approval constitutes a
"meaningful reduction" in a shareholder'sproportionateinterest
so as to qualify for sale or exchange treatment under section

302(b)(1). Recently, in Revenue Ruling 78-401, the Service
ruled that such a limited loss of control does not qualify, contrary
to two cases holding that it does. The author analyzes the ration-

ale underlying the use of control to test for essential equivalency
to a dividend and concludes that the test established in Revenue
Ruling 78-401 is correct.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Internal Revenue Code of 1954' sought to resolve the issue
of whether a redemption of stock by a corporation was essentially
equivalent to a dividend or whether it was in the nature of a capital
transaction entitled to capital gains treatment.' Judicial confusion
had resulted from the failure of prior statutes to adequately define
the standards by which such transactions were to be measured.' The
* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Illinois. Member of the Illinois and Colorado
Bars; B.A., 1975, Northwestern University; J.D., 1978, University of Denver; LL.M.
(Taxation) 1979, New York University.
1. I.R.C. § 1-9042.
2. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 307-09 (1970); see, e.g., Commissioner v. Cordingley, 78 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1935) (essential equivalence of distribution to dividend is question
of fact); Commissioner v. Quackenbos, 78 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1935) (search for valid business
purpose and lack of tax avoidance motive); Robinson v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 972 (5th Cir.
1934).
3. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 115(g)(1), 53 Stat. 1 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 302(b)(1)); Rev. Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 201(g), 44 Stat. 11; Rev. Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 201(f),
43 Stat. 253; Rev. Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 228.
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House of Representatives' version of the 1954 Code,4 codified at sections 302(b)(2) and (3) of the Code,5 fashioned a set of mechanical,
safe harbor rules in an attempt to reduce, if not eliminate, the
prevailing confusion. The Senate Finance Committee considered
the objective tests too constraining and added section 302(b)(1).1
Pursuant to section 302(b)(1), a redemption of stock7 is treated as a
sale or exchange if it is not essentially equivalent to a dividend."
Although similar to pre-1954 provisions,' the new section was designed to avoid past entanglements by limiting the inquiry to
whether the transaction could be characterized as a sale or exchange.' 0
Attempting to clarify one aspect of section 302(b(1), the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) issued Revenue Ruling 78-401."1
In Revenue Ruling 78-401, the Service addressed the issue of
whether a reduction in a shareholder's voting interest from ninety
percent to sixty percent, pursuant to a redemption, qualified for sale
or exchange treatment under section 302(b)(1). The Service held
that where a majority shareholder retains more than fifty percent
of the voting power of the corporation after a redemption, the trans4. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 302 (1954).
5. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)-(3).

6. SENATE COMM. ON FIN., INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 44 (1954).
7. "[Sltock shall be treated as redeemed by a corporation if the corporation acquires
its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property, whether or not the stock so acquired is
cancelled, retired, or held as treasury stock." I.R.C. § 317(b).
8. (a) GENERAL RULE.-If a corporation redeems its stock (within the meaning
of section 317(b)), and if paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (b) applies,
such redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in
exchange for the stock.
(b) REDEMPTION TREATED AS EXCHANGES.(1) REDEMPTIONS NOT EQUIVALENT TO DIvIDENDs.-Subsection (a) shall
apply if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
Id. § 302(a)-(b)(1).
9. (g) REDEMPTION OF STOCK.-If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock
(whether or not such stock was issued as a stock dividend) at such time and in
such manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole
or in part essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the
amount so distributed in redemption or cancellation of the stock, to the extent
that it represents a distribution of earnings or profits accumulated after February
28, 1913, shall be treated as a taxable dividend.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 115(g)(1), 53 Stat. 1 (current version at I.R.C. § 302(b)(1))
(emphasis added).
10. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 311 (1970); S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 6, at
234.
11. 1978-2 C.B. 127.
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action is essentially equivalent to a dividend. 2 Therefore, dividend
treatment, rather than sale or exchange treatment, should apply.13
This view is supported by many commentators who perceive the
major function of section 302(b)(1) as protecting minority shareholders (especially holders of nonvoting, preferred shares) whose
redemptions do not meet the strictures of section 302(b)(2) or (3).
The specific issue of whether the loss of two-thirds of the voting
power of a corporation but retention of more than fifty percent of
the voting power qualifies for section 302(b)(1) treatment has been
examined only twice prior to Revenue Ruling 78-401.'1 In both
Wright v. United States and Rickey v. United States, the courts
premised their acceptance of the taxpayer's claim to sale or exchange treatment, premising their decisions on the alleged significance of the loss of power by the redeemed shareholders individually
to effect those extraordinary corporate acts requiring two-thirds
shareholder approval under state law."6 Both decisions purport to
12. The Service appears to leave open two situations in which sale or exchange treatment
will be given the taxpayer although he does retain 50% of the voting power. If he can show
that 50% ownership does not give him control of the day-to-day activities of the corporation
or if he can show that a corporate vote requiring a two-thirds majority is imminent, he may
escape dividend treatment. Id. at 128.
13. Section 302(d) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that "if a corporation redeems
its stock ... , and if subsection (a) of this section does not apply, such redemption shall be
treated as a distribution of property to which section 301 applies."
14. E.g., Boyd, Section 302(b)(1) Redemptions-Recent Developments Indicate They
Are Still Alive, 55 TAxEs 491, 496 (1977); Significant Development, Federal Income
Tax-Family Hostility as Mitigating the Constructive Ownership Rules of Section 318 When
Applied to the Dividend Equivalency Provision of Section 302(b)(1), 55 B.U.L. REV. 667, 67980 (1975). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(a) (1955); S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 6, at 234.
15. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973); Rickey v. United States, 427
F. Supp. 484 (W.D. La. 1976). Strictly speaking, Wright is not a case arising under §
302(b)(1); it arose out of a reorganization under I.R.C. § 368. In Wright, the taxpayer received
consideration other than that allowed under § 368. The tax consequences of the receipt of
such additional consideration are outlined in I.R.C. § 356 and § 356(a)(2) which provide that
"[i]f an exchange ... has the effect of the distribution of a dividend," such an amount shall
be taxed as a dividend to the distributee. The courts, however, have recognized that the
dividend provision under § 356(a)(2) should be read in pari materia with the redemption
provisions of § 302. Wright, 482 F.2d at 605; Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747, 751
(2d Cir. 1956) (interpreting relevant provisions of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939); see Rev. Rul.
75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112, 113. Although the validity of this concept as a proposition generally
applicable to all redemptions has recently been seriously questioned, Shimberg v. United
States, 577 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'g, 415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 1019 (1979), a discussion of Wright is relevant because the decision reveals
the parameters of § 302(b)(1) as perceived by the courts. For a critical analysis of these two
cases, see notes 30-53 and accompanying text infra.
16. To amend the articles of incorporation, Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland
and Ohio require a two-thirds vote of shares. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 59, 3.03(5)
(1971 & Supp. II 1977). In instances where holders of a particular class of shares will be
adversely affected, a two-thirds vote (or greater) is required in Alabama, California, Idaho,
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comply with the mandates of the landmark decision in this area,
United States v. Davis."
Davis requires that a redemption must result in a "meaningful
reduction" in the proportionate economic interests of a shareholder
to qualify for sale or exchange treatment under section 302(b)(1).15
To infuse some degree of objectivity into the determination of what
constitutes a "meaningful reduction in the shareholder's proportionate interest," post-Davis decisions have focused on the change
of voting stock ownership resulting from the redemption."5 Except
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont and West Virginia. Id. Of the states which allow the adoption of amendments by incorporators or directors,
Connecticut and Nevada require at least two-thirds of the incorporators or directors to execute the amendment. Id. 3.03(7).
With reference to a voluntary dissolution, a two-thirds vote of all shares entitled to vote
thereon is required in Arkansas, Connecticut (or as provided in the certificate of incorporation), Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachussetts, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Wisconsin. Id. § 84, 3.03(4)(f). Alabama, Arizona and Michigan
require the approval of two-thirds of the outstanding shares. Id. 3.03(4)(g). Idaho and Utah
require the vote of two-thirds of all shares, Id. $ 3.03(4)(i), and Hawaii requires a three-fourths
vote of all stock having voting power. Id. 3.03(4)(j).
With respect to merger or consolidation, a two-thirds vote of approval by shareholders is
required in Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont and
West Virginia. Id. § 73, 3.03(4)(b). Arizona requires the approval by holders of two-thirds
in value of all shares. Id. Hawaii requires a three-fourths vote. Id.
For the sale of assets, approval by two-thirds of the shareholders entitled to vote thereon
is required in Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri,
New York, Ohio and Wisconsin. Id. §§ 78, 79 at 3.03(4)(d). Connecticut, North Carolina,
Rhode Island and South Carolina require the consent of two-thirds of the outstanding shares.
Id. Vermont requires the consent of two-thirds of the outstanding shares of the corporation
selling them and the corporation purchasing them, except that if the former is insolvent a
majority vote suffices. Id. Hawaii requires the approval of three-fourths of the shares entitled
to vote. Id.
In contrast to the aforementioned states, most states require only a simple majority
vote for these transactions. Id. §§ 59, 73, 78, 79, 84.
17. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
18. Id. at 313. In Davis, the Supreme Court of the United States reached three conclusions regarding the scope of § 302(b)(1): (1) to qualify for treatment as a sale or exchange a
redemption must result in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's interest, id.; (2) the
attribution rules of I.R.C. § 318 apply, id. at 307; and (3) a redemption of a portion of the
stock owned by a sole shareholder is always essentially equivalent to a dividend, id. The Court
reached these conclusions by reasoning that a transaction which results in the transfer of
property to the shareholder without a reduction in the shareholder's economic interests in the
corporation is essentially a dividend. Id. at 313.
19. By focusing on the change in voting rights the courts have adopted a control test.
The determinative factor is whether the shareholder is in control of the corporation before
and after the redemption. "Thus, it seems clear from these recent cases ..

that .. .the

courts consider loss of voting control to be the determinative factor .... Randall, Recent
Interpretationsof the "Meaningful Reduction" Test of I.R.C. Section 302(b)(1), B.Y.U. L.
REv. 253, 263 (1977). Accordingly, "[m]any post-Davis courts . ., have focused .. .on the
shareholder's ability to control future corporate action through voting power as the most

19791

REVENUE RULING 78-401

for the Wright and Rickey decisions, no post-Davis authority has
afforded sale or exchange treatment to a redemption failing to reduce the redeemed shareholder's interest below fifty percent. 0 The
only exceptions to this rule have involved redemptions resulting in
a loss of two-thirds majority shareholder status without a loss of
simple majority control. Revenue Ruling 78-401 fails to address either of these two exceptions."
This article will focus on the interdependence of the
"meaningful reduction" and "control" concepts in the case of redemptions from shareholders owning more than two-thirds of the
voting stock prior to the redemption. First, the directly applicable
authorities will be examined." Then, the analytical framework employed in cases involving related types of majority shareholder redemptions will be analyzed. 3 Particular attention will center on
whether the case law supports the "retained control" test estabimportant factor in determining dividend equivalence." Postlewaite & Finneran, Section
302(b)(1); The Expanding Minnow, 64 VA. L. REv. 561, 580 (1978). See also Rev. Rul. 75-502,
1975-2 C.B. 111.
The percentage-reduction-in-ownership test has received extensive support in the case
law. See, e.g., Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283, 286-87 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'g 415 F.
Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1019 (1979); Wright v. United States, 482
F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973); Morris v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 76, 79-80 (N.D. Tex. 1977);
Rickey v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 484, 492 (W.D. La. 1976); Title Ins. & Trust Co. v.
United States, 326 F. Supp. 617, 620-21 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1973);
Benjamin v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 1084, 1111-12 (1976), aff'd, 592 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1979);
Furr v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 426, 431-32 (1975); Furr v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M.
(CCH) 433, 435-36 (1975); Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280, 287-88 (1974), aff'd
per curiam, 535 F.2d 500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); Saweison v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 109,115 (1973); Fehrs Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 174,185 (1972), affd,
487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974); Stanley F. Grabowski Trust
ex rel. Grabrowski v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 650, 655-59 (1972); Miele v. Commissioner, 56
T.C. 556, 567 (1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
20. In Himmel v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964), the court identified three
economic interests which ownership of shares confers on a shareholder: the right to (1) vote,
(2) participate in earnings and profits, and (3) share in corporate assets upon liquidation. See
also Rev. Rul. 78-401, 1978-2 C.B. 127, 128. Whether these are the economic interests and
rights which are significant in a Davis analysis is a major topic of debate. E.g., Boyd, Section
302(b)(1) Redemptions-Recent Developments Indicate They Are Still Alive, 55 TAXES 491
(1977); Jacobson, CorporateDistributions:Not EssentiallyEquivalent to a Dividend;Assignment of Income and Other Problems, 33 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAx 1007 (1975); Levin, Stock
Redemption Under I.R.C. Sections 302, 303, and 304, 80 DICKINSON L. REv. 434 (1976);
Postlewaite & Finneran, supra note 19; Randall, supra note 19; Zinn & Silverman,
Redemptions of Stock Under Section 302(b)(1), 32 TAx LAW. 91 (1978); Significant Development, supra note 14.
21. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973); Rickey v. United States, 427
F. Supp. 484 (W.D. La. 1976).
22. See notes 25-53 and accompanying text infra.
23. See notes 54-88 and accompanying text infra.
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lished in Revenue Ruling 78-401 or the "relinquished control" test
of the contrary authorities.2'
II.

RETAINED CONTROL VERSUS RELINQUISHED CONTROL:

A

STUDY IN

CONTRADICTION

Revenue Ruling 78-401 is the most recent authority to discuss
the tax consequences of redemptions of stock from shareholders
initially owning more than two-thirds of the voting stock. The facts
of the ruling are surprisingly brief. X Corporation had 1,000 shares
of voting common stock issued and outstanding, of which A owned
90% and B owned 10%. X Corporation redeemed 750 of A's shares.
As a result of the redemption, A's voting interest was reduced to
60%, while B's interest increased to 40%. The laws of state D, X's
state of incorporation, required approval by two-thirds of the voting
shares for such extraordinary corporate acts as merger, liquidation,
or sale of substantially all the operating assets.25 The taxpayer contended that section 302(b)(1) controlled the transaction. Relying on
United States v. Davis,"6 which holds that only "meaningful reductions in a shareholder's proportionate interest" qualify for sale or
exchange treatment under section 302(b)(1), the Service rejected
the taxpayer's contention.
In analyzing whether there had been a meaningful reduction in
the shareholder's proportionate interest, the Service employed the
standards of Revenue Ruling 75-502,27 i.e., a shareholder's interest

consists of three elements: the shareholder's right to (1) vote, and
thereby exercise control; (2) participate in earnings; and (3) share
in liquidating distributions. Significantly, the Service analyzed only
the voting control component of the taxpayer's shareholder interest.28 Although A had surrendered the ability to control those corporate decisions requiring a two-thirds vote, he had retained control
of the day-to-day affairs of X. In the absence of any indication that
extraordinary corporate action was imminent, the retention by A of
60% of the voting rights in X was deemed to be dispositive of the
meaningful reduction issue. Consequently, the Service ruled that
the redemption was to be treated as a distribution under the rules
of sections 302(d) and 301.n
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See notes 15-20 and accompanying text supra.
1978-2 C.B. at 127-28.
397 U.S. 301, 313 (1969).
1975-2 C.B. 111.
See 1978-2 C.B. at 128.
Id.
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The emphasis of the Service in Revenue Ruling 78-401 is clear.
Regardless of the supermajority control relinquished by the taxpayer, his retention of simple majority control over the day-to-day
activities of X was fatal to his claim to sale or exchange treatment.
The "retained control" test postulated in Revenue Ruling 78-401 is
premised on the theory that one who controls day-to-day activities
of a corporation through a simple majority holding of voting stock
is in a position to decide whether any corporate distributions will
be made and what form they will take. Inherent in such power is
the ability to devise means of circumventing the tax impact of dividend distribution through the judicious use of corporate redemptions. Redemptions of control shares should, therefore, be closely
scrutinized to determine whether there has been a meaningful reduction in the shareholder's interest.
In reaching its result in Revenue Ruling 78-401, the Service did
not discuss two cases which are in apparent conflict with the ruling.
The first, Wright v. United States, 0 involved the consolidation of
two corporations, F & G and Worldwide, Inc., into a new Omni
Corporation. Prior to the consolidation, the taxpayer owned 99.2%
of F & G's and 56% of Worldwide's voting shares. 3 ' As a result of
the reorganization, the taxpayer held 61.7% of the new corporation,
Omni. 31 In addition to the Omni shares, the taxpayer received
"boot" in the form of a $102,000 promissory note from Omni.33
The only issue before the court was the proper characterization
of the boot property. For purposes of determining whether the boot
element had "the effect of the distribution of a dividend, ' 3 the
Commissioner conceded that the redemption rules of section 302(b)
30. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
31. Of F & G's 240 total shares, the taxpayer owned 238 shares (99.2%), the taxpayer's
wife owned 1 share (.4%), and Mr. John Thurman owned 1 share (.4%). Of Worldwide's 1077
shares outstanding, the taxpayer owned 603 shares (56%), Mr. Dunn owned 323 shares (30%),
the taxpayer's mother owned a total of 150 shares (13.9%), and 1 share was owned by Mr.
Thurman (.0009%). Id. at 602-03.
32. Following the consolidation of F & G and Worldwide, the taxpayer owned 2222 shares
of Omni (61.7%), Mr. Dunn owned 1,000 shares (36%), the taxpayer's mother and wife owned
a total 355 shares, and Mr. Thurman owned the remaining 23 shares. Id.
33. Following the ruling of the District Court that the promissory note constituted
"boot" received in a § 368(a)(1)(A) reorganization, the taxpayer conceded that the transaction did constitute a § 368(a)(1)(A) statutory merger or consolidation. See id. at 602; note 15
supra.
34. I.R.C§ 356(a)(2). For an excellent discussion of the proper tax treatment of boot in
a reorganization, see Levin, Adess & McGaffey, Boot Distributionsin CorporateReorganizations-Determinationof Dividend Equivalency, 30 TAx LAw. 287 (1977).
Serious doubt exists regarding the scope of the Wright decision's incorporation of the
rules of § 302(b)(1) into § 356(a)(2), in light of Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th
Cir. 1978), rev'g 415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1019 (1979).
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controlled. The court considered, but rejected, the applicability of
the "safe-harbor" provisions of sections 302(b)(2) or (3). The court
then considered the effect of section 302(b)(1) in the light of Davis:
"We read

. .

.Davis as holding that the proper inquiry is the per-

centage change of ownership in the corporation and the attendant
overall results due to that change."" Having so focused its inquiry,
the court proceeded to determine the specific percentage reduction
in the shareholder's voting interest. First, the court observed that
if F & G and Worldwide had been consolidated without any boot
property passing to the shareholder, Mr. Wright would have received 85% of the Omni voting stock. Because boot was present in
the reorganization, he received only 61.7% of the Omni voting
shares. Consequently, the net percentage change in the taxpayer's
voting interest amounted to 23.3%.3' The only remaining issue was
the "meaningfulness" of this reduction. Observing that two-thirds
shareholder approval of extraordinary corporate acts was required
that the shareholder's loss of
under state law, the court concluded
37
such power was meaningful.

In a subsequent decision, Rickey v. United States,31 the District Court for the Western District of Louisiana adopted the
Wright analysis without qualification. Rickey involved a taxpayer's
attempt to reduce his 72% voting interest to 49% by means of an
initial redemption followed in the succeeding year by various gifts
and charitable contributions of his stock. The taxpayer argued that
each of the various transactions constituted component elements of
an integrated plan. Conversely, the Commissioner insisted that the
transactions be taxed as separate and distinct events. Based on a
thorough review of the facts, the court held for the taxpayer.
The court fashioned two alternative grounds to support the
taxpayer's claim to sale or exchange treatment. First, if viewed as
an integrated transaction, the net reduction in the shareholder's
voting interest from 72% to 49% satisfied the "safe-harbor" tests of
section 302(b)(2). 3 In the alternative, the court held that section

35. 482 F.2d at 609.
36. See id. at 609-10.
37. See id.
38. 427 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. La. 1976).
39. Id. at 490-92. In support of its conclusion, the court observed that a 72% interest was
so large that it would be difficult for the corporation to redeem the entire interest upon the
shareholder's death; the taxpayer's health was admittedly poor; the taxpayer's control position with respect to other corporations was causing the corporation consolidated return problems; and absent a redemption of some of the taxpayer's shares, the death of the taxpayer
might result in passage of that large block of shares to nonoperating persons. These considerations forced the taxpayer to structure the transaction in various steps to achieve the desired
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302(b)(1) was applicable to the initial redemption which had resulted in a reduction of the shareholder's control over the total
voting power from 72% to 58%. Citing the Wright decision, the court
concluded that the shareholder's loss of status as a two-thirds majority shareholder altered the economic interests and rights of the
shareholders inter se so significantly as to constitute a meaningful
reduction in the redeemed shareholder's proportionate interest. 0
A comparison of Revenue Ruling 78-401 with the Wright and
Rickey decisions reveals some startling differences. The focal point
in Revenue Ruling 78-401 rests squarely on the element of control
retained by the redeemed shareholder after the redemption in issue.
Despite relinquishment by the shareholder of that bundle of rights
inherent in the ownership of two-thirds or more of the voting stock,
the retention of more than 50% of the voting power dominates the
Service's analysis. Consequently, the ruling adopts a two-step
analysis for redemptions from majority shareholders. First, loss of
day-to-day control, i.e., ownership-of 50% or less of the voting
stock, assumes the status of a threshold requirement. Only if this
requirement is satisfied, need the inquiry progress to the second,
more subjective, issue of the "meaningfulness" of the reduction
in question."
In contrast, the Wright and Rickey decisions focus on the dereduction in Rickey's interest.
Thus, by applying the mechanical rules of Sec. 302(b)(2) we see that after the
completion of the plan, he owned less than 50% of the total combined voting
stock, and he owned less than 80% of the stock he had owned prior to the October
1969 redemption

. . .

. The effect of the overall plan was a substantially dispro-

portionate distribution ....
Id. at 492.
40. Id. at 492-93.
41. The retained-control test, in effect, begins to look much like the safe harbor tests of
§ 302(b)(2) when a redemption from a majority shareholder under § 302(b)(1) is involved.
As a threshold requirement, § 302(b)(2)(B) mandates that the redeemed shareholder own less
than 50% of the total combined voting power after the redemption. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(B).
Only if this requirement is satisfied does the second issue, ownership of less than 80% of the
stock owned prior to the redemption, come into play.
The retained-control test performs a similar function in the § 302(b)(1) area. Only if the
majority shareholder retains 50% or less of the voting power after the redemption need the
courts examine the more subjective issue of "meaningful reduction." In effect, the retainedcontrol test asks a very simple question: Who has retained the bundle of rights associated
with the concept of control: the power to determine furture dividends and redemptions
without the approval of minority shareholders?
The courts have perceived the retained-control test as performing double duty. Not only
will loss of control satisfy the threshold requirement, but satisfaction of the test (loss of
majority status) is itself an indicator of the meaningfulness of the reduction in the redeemed
shareholder's interest. For discussion of this analysis, see notes 54-88 and accompanying text
infra.
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gree of control relinquished by the redeemed shareholder. Neither
opinion discusses the significance of the shareholder's retained control over daily corporate activities.2 The absolute reduction suffered
by Mr. Wright and Mr. Rickey in voting share ownership commands
little significance in either decision. Neither court makes any reference to the nature of the control retained by the shareholder. One
is left to assume that the result in both decisions would have been
-the same regardless of the number of voting shares redeemed, so
long as the redemption resulted in a loss of two-thirds majority
shareholder status. In effect, the Wright and Rickey decisions
equate "control" with its component elements.
Numerous questions remain unanswered after the Wright and
Rickey decisions. First, is the relinquished-control test to be a per
se test, or merely a case-by-case approach, weighing all the facts
and circumstances? 3 If the latter is the proper interpretation, nei42. Surprisingly, neither decision discusses the fact that no other authority has ever
adopted any definition of control other than simple majority control for purposes of §
302(b)(1). See Zinn & Silverman, supra note 20, at 96 ("With two exceptions, every court to
consider this issue subsequent to Davis has made an ultimate finding of dividend equivalency."). See also Postlewaite & Finneran, supra note 19, at nn. 101, 136-42 and accompanying text (uncertainty about the definition of control in a § 302(b) (1) redemption centers solely
around the Wright and Rickey decisions); Randall, supra note 19, at 258-63 (general discussion of control focusing on the predominance of simple majority control in the case law). For
a general discussion of the cases discussing control, see notes 44-47 and accompanying text
infra.
The Tax Court, in Benjamin v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 1084, 1111 (1976), aff'd, 592 F.2d
1259 (5th Cir. 1979), observed that the relevant underlying rights in a § 302(b)(1) inquiry are
the right to determine the amount and timing of dividends, redemptions and liquidations;
the right to control the board of directors on a day-to-day basis; the power to appoint officers
and fix their salaries; and the right to authorize loans. See also Stanley F. Grabowski Trust
ex rel. Grabowski v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 650, 659 (1972) (control defined as the power to
determine dividends and redemptions). Nowhere does Wright or Rickey discuss these facets
of the concept of "control."
43. Neither the Wright nor the Rickey opinion states whether loss of status as a twothirds majority shareholder will always produce a meaningful reduction in the shareholder's
proportionate interest. The overlay of the actual and constructive ownership rules of I.R.C.
§ 318 creates numerous unanswered questions. Consider the following hypothetical situations:
(1) Prior to the redemption in issue, A owns 80% of the voting stock of X Corporation. All 80% is directly owned by A. After the redemption, A directly owns 60%
of X and owns an additional 10% of X's stock constructively.
(2) Prior to the redemption, A owns 65% of the X voting stock, directly, and
15%, constructively. After the redemption, A directly owns 50% of the X voting
stock and continues to own an additional 15%, indirectly.
Should the Wright analysis apply to the first hypothetical? The courts have rejected any
distinction between direct and indirect ownership for purposes of determing control under §
302(b)(1). Davis, 397 U.S. at 307. The dissenting opinion of Judge Bright argues that the facts
in Wright presented such a situation. Wright, 482 F.2d at 610 (Bright, J., dissenting). Judge
Bright took the majority to task for failing to apply the attribution rules of I.R.C. § 318 to
the facts before the court. If the majority had properly done so, Judge Bright noted, the
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ther court has offered any indication of the factors relevant to such
an inquiry.
Second, and more importantly, the relinquished-control test as
established in Wright and Rickey fails to embody both aspects of
the Davis test. The opinions in both Rickey and Wright emphasize
that the meaningful reduction test fashioned by Davis is twopronged: the redeemed shareholder's voting power must be reduced,
and the relationships among the shareholders altered significantly."
But the relinquished-control test of the Wright and Rickey decisions
fails to take full account of the latter issue. After determining that
the shareholder in each case had suffered a net reduction in his
voting interest, each opinion simply states, in a very conclusory
fashion, that the loss of status as a two-thirds majority shareholder
must represent a meaningful reduction in interest. 5
Neither opinion discusses the effects of the redemptions on
the holders of nonredeemed shares, and both fail to examine
taxpayer's postredemption interest, augmented by his wife's and mother's shares, would have
been 72%. In such an instance, Judge Bright states that even the majority would have denied
§ 302(b)(1) sale or exchange treatment to the taxpayer. The majority recognized that the
attribution rules of § 318 apply to a § 302(b)(1) redemption. Id. at 607 n.14. This argument,
however, was rejected because the Commissioner failed to raise the issue in a timely manner.
Id. at 610. Nevertheless, the court failed to indicate what, if any, impact this would have on
the analysis and result.
In the second hypothetical, the taxpayer never actually owned the requisite number of
shares necessary to command a two-thirds majority shareholder status. Only by attribution
does his preredemption interest exceed 66.67% His postredemption holdings, actual and
constructive, total 65%. Under Davis, no distinction should be drawn between shares actually
owned and those constructively owned. Arguably, however, the transaction should not be
accorded sale or exchange treatment because the analysis in Wright is premised on a taxpayer's ability individually to affect the outcome of exraordinary acts, whereas this taxpayer
never had such control. If Wright establishes a per se test, the transaction should result in
sale or exchange treatment because of the strictures of Davis. On the other hand, if Wright
supports a case-by-case analysis, the contrary result could be reached by arguing that the
taxpayer never actually had what he claims to have lost. Yet, the analysis in Wright offers
no guidance to the resolution of this dilemma.
44. Wright, 482 F.2d at 608-09; Rickey, 427 F. Supp. at 492-93. Courts have repeatedly
emphasized the second element of the Davis test. See, e.g., Shimberg v. United States, 577
F.2d 283, 286-87, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1019 (1979) (denying sale or exchange treatment
because relationship with other shareholders had not changed); Morris v. United States, 441
F. Supp. 76, 80 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (relevant question is whether the redemption changed the
relative economic interests or rights of the shareholders); Benjamin v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.
1084, 1111 (1976), aff'd, 592 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1979) (no change in her relations to the
residual shareholders); Furr v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 426, 431 (1975) (must change
the relative economic interests and rights of ownership).
45. Wright, 482 F.2d at 609 ("The redemption here has created a meaningful change in
the voting power of the taxpayer under Arkansas law."); Rickey, 427 F. Supp. at 492-93
("Thus under the principles set out in Davis and Wright, . . . the redemption resulted in
a meaningful reduction of Mr. Rickey's ownership interest and significantly altered his
economic interests and rights relative to the other shareholders.").
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thoroughly the interrelationships among the shareholders. There
is no mention of the fact that the minority shareholders possessed
no greater control over the corporation after the redemption than
they possessed prior to it. For example, such shareholders enjoy no
control over the timing or amount of dividends, the adoption of a
plan of redemption, the liquidation of the corporation, the appointment of officers and the setting of their salaries, or the authorization of loans." In effect, a majority shareholder's relinquishment
of his power to effect, by himself, those corporate acts requiring a
two-thirds shareholder approval gives rise only to a veto power in
the minority shareholders. No affirmative power is conveyed to
the minority; rather, the minority shareholders are possessed only
of a power to prevent the majority from implementing certain
corporate decisions. Whether this transformation of a majority
shareholder's preredemption supermajority power into a postredemption minority shareholders' veto power constitutes a significant alteration of the shareholder relationships inter se, is a
question that receives little analytical treatment in the Wright or
Rickey decisions and none in the other relevant authorities. 7
46. All of these factors have been considered relevant in the determination of what
constitutes a meaningful reduction in the shareholder's interest. Benjamin v. Commissioner,
66 T.C. at 1111; see Stanley F. Grabowski Trust ex rel. Grabowski v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.
650, 659 (1972) (power to declare dividends and redemptions is the relevant inquiry under §
302(b)(1)).
47. It is at this point that the theoretical inadequacies of the relinquished-control test
become most apparent. The Wright and Rickey decisions hold that the relinquishment of a
power that the redeemed shareholder had no present intention of exercising, that had no
impact on his day-to-day control over corporate activities, and that granted no affirmative
power to the minority shareholders is a significant and meaningful reduction in that majority
shareholder's proportionate interest. From a subjective standpoint, this raises serious conceptual difficulties. Are we to asume that relinquishment of the power inherent in two-thirds
voting ownership is equivalent to the loss of majority ownership? If not, how can one determine the significance of such loss?
One author has argued that the position taken by the courts in Wright and Rickey is
correct:
To determine whether a redemption results in a shareholder's loss of a significant amount of corporate control, one must consult the origins of corporate
power-the articles of incorporation, corporate bylaws, and applicable state law.
These sources of corporate power typically provide a supermajority voting requirement for extraordinary corporate transactions, such as amending the articles of
incorporation, forcing a merger or a consolidation, or commanding a dissolution
or a sale of all the corporate assets. The loss of sufficient corporate control to
satisfy these supermajority voting requirements is no less a loss of corporate
control or voting power than the loss of corporate control sustained by the shareholder in Revenue Ruling 76-364.
2 J. Corp. L. 568, 579-80 (1977) (footnotes omitted). In Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2 C.B. 91, to
which the author analogizes, the Service held that a reduction in voting power from 27% to
22.27% was a meaningful reduction in the shareholder's proportionate interest. The rationale
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In contrast, the retained-control test of Revenue Ruling 78401 fully analyzes both the voting power reduction element as well
as the significant alteration of shareholder relationships element
of the Davis meaningful reduction test. In the ruling, the Service
correctly noted that the redeemed shareholder suffered a 30% reduction in his voting interest.'8 This reduction exceeded the percentage reductions in both the Wright and Rickey decisions.19 The analysis of the Service did not stop there, however. Instead, the Service
focused on the second aspect of the Davis test: Were the economic
interests and rights of the shareholders significantly altered? The
retention by A, the redeemed shareholder, of more than 50% of
the voting power after the redemption required a negative response
to this question. Retention by A of exclusive control over the dayto-day operations of the corporation rendered the impact of the
underlying this result was that with 27% of the vote the taxpayer had control of the corporation when voting with only one other stockholder, whereas by reducing his proportion of
control to 22.27%, the taxpayer required the vote of at least two other stockholders to control
corporate activities.
Similarly, it could be argued that the fact that no affirmative right has been conveyed
to the minority shareholders is irrelevant. In Rev. Rul. 75-502, 1975-2 C.B. 111, the Service
held that a reduction in control of voting rights from 57% to 50% was meaningful. This
redemption did not result in the vesting of any affirmative power in the other single shareholder because the taxpayer could block any proposed action by virtue of his control of 50%
of the voting rights. The other shareholder, however, could exercise a similar veto power. The
Service held the reduction meaningful because the taxpayer had lost his dominant voting
rights. Id. at 112.
Nevertheless, most commentators have read the Wright and Rickey opinions with great
skepticism. E.g., Zinn & Silverman, supra note 20, at 97 (questioning whether a reduction is
meaningful if state law requires supermajority shareholder approval for only a few acts not
contemplated at time of redemption and contingent on speculative future events). Moreover,
the very arguments postulated in favor of the relinquished-control test demonstrates its
myopic approach.
These arguments offer neither authority nor analysis in support of the position that
supermajority voting requirements fall within the emerging federal notion of control in a §
302(b)(1) context. It is difficult to conceive of the power of minority shareholders to block
certain corporate acts requiring two-thirds shareholder approval as a significant component
of control. Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to reconcile this position with case law in
the area. Other than Wright and Rickey there is no support for this proposition. It flies in
the face of the analysis proffered in cases which discuss the components of control. The
rights mentioned as underlying the concept of control relevant in a § 302(b)(1) inquiry are
those which require majority control (e.g., declaration of dividend). See note 42 supra.
Nowhere are acts requiring a supermajority vote mentioned. Even Rev. Ruls. 76-364 and 75502 involve simple majority control, or its loss.
Moreover, by focusing its inquiry solely on what the majority shareholder has relinquished, the relinquished-control test ignores the issue of the impact of the redemption on
the remaining shareholders..Thus, the relinquished-control test fails to analyze fully the effect
of the redemption on the interrelationship between the stockholders.
48. 1978-2 C.B. at 128.
49. See notes 30-40 and accompanying text supra.
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redemption on the minority shareholders nugatory. Despite an increased interest in earnings and liquidation proceeds, each minority
shareholder posessed no power to effect the distribution of such
amounts. In effect, day-to-day control over corporate affairs remained unaltered; with respect to the right to declare dividends or
redeem stock, the redeemed majority shareholder still possessed
5
exclusive control. 0
Finally, the retained control test of Revenue Ruling 78-401 has
been the implicit, if not the explicit, foundation of many of the postDavis decisions involving redemptions from majority shareholders."
As noted earlier, no other post-Davis authority has recognized as
meaningful a redemption that fails to reduce a preredemption
majority shareholder's interest to 50% or less.52 In addition, the
courts and the Service have repeatedly viewed the "control" concept as the cornerstone of the section 302(b)(1) analytical framework." Outside the Wright and Rickey decisions, no court has attached any significance to the concept of control other than as defined by simple majority voting stock ownership.

III.

RETAINED CONTROL AND REDEMPTIONS BY MAJORITY SHAREHOLDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ALTERNATIVES

The factual settings typified by Revenue Ruling 78-401 and
Wright can be described as those in which the redeemed shareholder
owns more than two-thirds of the corporate voting power before the
redemption, and, although the shareholder's interest falls below
that level after the redemption, he still retains simple majority control. This situation, however, represents only a tiny fragment of the
broader issue of the proper treatment of corporate redemptions from
majority shareholders. Indeed, three additional categories may be
identified:
50. The retained-control test serves two purposes. First, it measures the actual percentage reduction in the redeemed shareholder's voting power. Second, it necessarily calculates
the percentage of voting power not owned by the redeemed shareholder. This latter measurement directly relates to the issue of whether the relative rights and interests of the shareholders inter se have been significantly altered.
The retained-control test avoids the difficult conceptual problem of subjectively evaluating the meaningfulness of the reduction in the shareholder's number of shares. In place of
the subjective inquiry, the retained-control test offers an objective approach: Has the redeemed shareholder retained control over the day-to-day activities of the corporation? An
affirmative answer to this inquiry ends the analysis. Only if the response is negative need the
court delve into subjective factors.
51. See, e.g., cases cited in note 44 supra.
52. See note 19 supra.
53. See notes 19-20 supra.
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Category I: The redeemed shareholder actually or constructively owns 100% of the voting stock of the corporation before and
after the redemption."
Category II: The redeemed shareholder actually or constructively owns less than 100% but more than two-thirds of the voting
stock of the corporation both before and after the redemption.55
Category III: The redeemed shareholder actually or constructively owns more than 50% but less than two-thirds of the voting
stock of the corporation before and after the redemption."
Categorization of redemptions from majority shareholders in
this manner facilitates the development of a framework within
which to analyze the emerging body of case law and rulings on
section 302(b)(1). More importantly, however, this framework reinforces the conclusion that courts focus on the amount of control
retained, not the amount of control relinquished, by a shareholder
in a redemption. In each decision discussed below, the retention of
day-to-day control by the redeemed shareholder is the single, predominant factor. Significantly, in none of these decisions is a redemption involving retention by the redeemed shareholder of more
than 50% of the voting power afforded sale or exchange treatment.
Thus, despite the factual dissimilarities among the following cases,
the retained-control test of Revenue Ruling 78-401 appears to be
dispositive of the section 302(b)(1) issue.
A.

Category I: Absolute Control

The Tax Court's opinion in Benjamin v. Commissioner" is representative of a Category I redemption pattern. Mrs. Benjamin, the
taxpayer, owned all of the class A and class B voting preferred
shares of Starmount Corporation. Voting and management control
of the corporation were vested exclusively in these two classes of

54. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970), is an example of this category of redemption. For lack of a more descriptive label, this category will be referred to as "retention of
absolute voting control." See Benjamin v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 1084, 1111 (1976), aff'd,
592 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1979).
55. This category will be referred to as "retention of dominant voting control." See, e.g.,
Fehrs Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 174, 185 (1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974); Furr v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 426, 431 (1975).
The predominant characteristic of this category is the ownership by the taxpayer/shareholder
of sufficient voting power, either actually or constructively, to effect any corporate act regardless of the proportion of votes required to approve it.
56. This category consists of redemptions by shareholders who possess only "simple
majority voting control." See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-218, 1977-1 C.B. 81; Rev. Rul. 75-502, 19752 C.B. 111.
57. 66 T.C. 1084 (1976), aff'd, 592 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1979).
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stock. Starmount redeemed 2,000 of the taxpayer's 4,732 class A
shares. The taxpayer claimed that this distribution was not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
The Tax Court unequivocally rejected this argument. Instead,
the court found that the changes in net worth and participation in
earnings which the taxpayer had experienced were outweighed by
her retention of absolute voting control. Arguably, a distribution
[w]ithout any reduction in control . . .savors of a dividend

... .Where the redeemed shareholder has sufficient voting
power to control the activities of the corporation

. . .

and where

he retains that same degree of control after a redemption distribution, such circumstances are strong indications that the transaction does not come within the confines of section 302(b)(1).

5
8

Thus, under the Benjamin rationale, a shareholder who retains the
same degree of control after the redemption as he had before the
redemption will not qualify under section 302(b)(1). 51
The Benjamin decision is unusual in its clarity. Many of the
decisions addressing the problem of redemptions from 100%
shareholders fail to state clearly whether they are implementing
the retained-control or the relinquished-control test. 0 Instead,
the courts emphasize either that no reduction in control has
58. 66 T.C. at 1111.
59. Id. at 1111-12. The Benajmin decision is also noteworthy for its explication of the
constituent elements subsumed under the heading "voting control";
Controlling the activities of a family corporation through voting superiority, or
supremacy, is the most significant attribute a shareholder possesses. . . .Such
voting control normally carries with it the power to declare dividends and approve
a liquidation in addition to other economic advantages such as controlling,
through the board of directors, the timing of dividends and redemptions, appointing and fixing the salaries of officers and authorizing loans.
Id. at 1111. Simple majority control possesses all of these attributes.
60. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 434 F.2d 340, 344 (8th Cir. 1970) (redemption
from sole shareholder always essentially equivalent to a dividend); Greenberg v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 331, 350-51 (1974) (distribution essentially equivalent to dividend where
taxpayer is sole shareholder after redemption), aff'd mem., 526 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976); Grey v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1032, 1072-73 (1971) (distribution essentially equivalent to dividend if taxpayer exercises substantial control over transaction), rev'd on other grounds, 561 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977); Maher v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.
441, 453 (1970) (redemption of sole shareholder essentially equivalent to dividend), modified,
469 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1972); Estate of Runnels v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 762, 765-66 (1970)
(distribution to constructive 100% owner essentially equivalent to dividend); Estate of Lammerts v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 420, 444-45 (1970) ("net effect" test inapplicable to 100%
shareholder), affd per curiam on other grounds, 456 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Rev.
Rul. 75-174, 1975-1 C.B. 252 (100% before and after) Rev. Rul. 72-57, 1972-1 C.B. 103 (same);
Rev. Rul. 71-563, 1971-2 C.B. 175 (same); Rev. Rul. 71-261, 1971-2 C.B. 108 (same); Rev. Rul.
70-496, 1970-2 C.B. 74 (same).
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occurred,"' or that if one has occurred, it did not significantly affect
the stockholder's relationship to the corporation. 2
The analysis in the Benjamin decision, resting on the retained
control test, represents a welcome clarification of the two-pronged
Davis test. The court in Benjamin never addressed the specific issue
of whether a decrease in the absolute number of shares is accompanied by any reduction in voting control. The failure to address this
issue can be explained by either of two reasons: First, the court
appears to have adopted the no-reduction-in-control test.63 Alternatively, even if the taxpayer's decrease in shares actually owned satisfied the language of Davis, the redemption nevertheless failed to
satisfy the threshold requirement of loss of day-to-day control.64
Either analysis is consistent with the Davis test; both analyses are
premised on the retained-control test.
B.

Category II: Dominant Voting Control

In contrast to Category I redemptions, those within Category II
do present instances of actual reductions in the taxpayers' voting
interests. Despite this distinction, the courts have resorted to an
analysis similar to that used in Category I redemptions. Specifically, the retention of control over corporate activities has been
dispositive of the taxpayer's claim of sale or exchange treatment
under section 302(b)(1).
Category II is represented by a trilogy of Tax Court decisions.
5 involved a section
The first, Fehrs Finance Co. v. Commissioner,"
304(a)(1) redemption. 6 Prior to the taxpayer's sale to the controlled
61. See Maher v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 441, 453 (1970) (no reduction), modified, 469
F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1972).
62. See Runnels v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 762, 766 (1970); Lammerts v. Commissioner,
54 T.C. 420, 444 (1970).
63. 66 T.C. at 1111. It was not necessary to address the issue because the court found
that the taxpayer had retained absolute control.
64. The court stated that "[wihatever changes in net worth and participation in earnings [the taxpayer] experienced .
retention of absolute voting control . . . outweighs any
other consideration." Id.
65. 58 T.C. 174 (1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938
(1974).
66. (a) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN STOCK PURCHASES.(1) ACQUISITION BY RELATED CORPORATION (OTHER THAN SUBSIDIARY).-For
purposes of sections 302 and 303, if(A) one or more persons are in control of each of two corporations, and
(B) in return for property, one of the corporations acquires stock in the other
corporation from the person (or persons) so in control, then (unless paragraph (2)
applies) such property shall be treated as a distribution in redemption of the stock
of the corporation acquiring such stock. In any such case, the stock so acquired
shall be treated as having been transferred by the person from whom acquired,
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acquiring corporation, the taxpayer and his wife owned 98.2% of the
shares of the issuing corporation. As a result of the transaction, the
taxpayer's voting ownership was reduced to an 88.69% constructive
interest. Based upon the elimination of their direct voting stock
ownership, coupled with the net percentage reduction in his actual
and constructive voting stock interest, the taxpayers sought sale or
exchange treatment.
As a preliminary matter, the Tax Court noted that the Davis
decision eliminated any conceptual differences between actual and
constructive ownership for purposes of section 302(b)(1).17 Therefore, the only issue remaining was the meaningfulness of the 9.51%
reduction in the taxpayer's preredemption 98.2% interest. The court
resolved this issue by concluding that "[a] reduction . . . from 98.2
percent to 88.69 percent does not deprive such a dominant shareholder of his ability to control the corporate activities; such a reduction does not affect the shareholder's relationship to the corporation
in any significant way." 8 There are strong indications in the Fehrs
opinion that the Tax Court equated control with ownership of a
simple majority of the voting stock."
and as having been received by the corporation acquiring it, as a contribution to
the capital of such corporation.
I.R.C. § 304(a)(1).
I.R.C. § 304(b)(1) provides that § 302(b) tests shall be applied with respect to the
ownership in the issuing corporation. The amount which may constitute a dividend, however,
is limited to the acquiring corporation's earnings and profits. I.R.C. § 304(b)(2)(A). For a
discussion of § 304, see Marano, Section 304: The Shadowy World of Redemptions Through
Related Corporations, 22 TAx L. REv. 161 (1967).
67. 58 T.C. at 187. The Supreme Court of the United States held in Davis that the
attribution rules of I.R.C. § 318 are applicable to § 302(b)(1). 397 U.S. at 307. Subsequent
decisions have interpreted this as meaning that for purposes of determining control under §
302(b)(1), actual and constructive ownership are not to be differentiated. See, e.g., Niedermeyer v. Commissioner. 62 T.C. 280, 285 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 535 F.2d 500 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); Fehrs Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 174, 187 (1972),
aff'd, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974).
68. 58 T.C. at 185.
69. The court noted that the Supreme .Court in Davis had concluded that Congress had
a very limited purpose in reinstating the dividend equivalency test in the 1954 Code; the test
"was included to ease what would otherwise be the harsh result of section 302 'in the case of
redemptions of preferred stock which might be called by the corporation without the shareholder having any control over when the redemption may take place.'" 58 T.C. at 186
(quoting S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1954)). In the instant case, Mr. Fehrs was
not an unwilling participant in the redemption. On the contrary, by virtue of his retained
88.69% constructive ownership, he was the "guiding force behind it." Id. at 186. Such a
characterization, however, would be applicable to any shareholder who controlled a simple
majority. Thus, the court implicitly found that the Senate's definition of control would be
inconsistent with any definition other than simple majority stock ownership.
For other cases discussing this Senate report, see Davis, 397 U.S. at 310; Benjamin v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 1084, (1976), aff'd, 592 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1979); Grey v. Commis-

19791

REVENUE RULING 78-401

The Tax Court iterated this position in Niedermeyer v.
Commissioner.70 Like Fehrs Finance Co., this case involved a section
304(a)(1) redemption. As a result of Lents Industries, Inc.'s redemption of the taxpayer's voting stock in American Timber & Trading
Co. (AT&T), the taxpayer's holdings of voting stock were reduced
from a 90.49% actual and constructive ownership interest to a constructive 82.96% interest.7 ' As in Fehrs Finance Co., the taxpayer
rested his claim to sale or exchange treatment on his complete abrogation of any direct interest in AT&T, coupled with his net reduction in ownership of 7.53%.
Rejecting the taxpayer's claim, the Tax Court made two observations. First, citing Fehrs, the court refused to recognize any distinction between actual and constructive stock ownership under
section 302(b)(1). 72 Second, the court noted that the reduction was
not meaningful: "With such a small change in a high percentage
interest, [the taxpayer's] control and ownership of AT&T is essentially unaltered and cannot be considered to have undergone a
meaningful reduction. An 82.96% interest clearly is sufficient to
dominate and control the policies of the corporation."73 As in Fehrs,
there is nothing in the Niedermeyer opinion which indicates that
the court defined control as other than simple majority voting ownership."
The decision in Furr v. Commissioner" is the final case in the
trilogy of Category II cases. Furr involved a redemption of 1.7% of
the taxpayer's class B nonvoting stock. As a result, the taxpayer's
percentage ownership of class B shares fell from 41.2% to 39.5%. The
taxpayer's 72.34% interest in class A voting stock, however, remained unaltered. In reaching the conclusion that the taxpayer's
sioner, 56 T.C. 1032, 1072 (1971), rev'd, 561 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977); Lammerts v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 420, 443 n.35 (1970). See also Postlewaite & Finneran, supra note 19, at 568.
70. 62 T.C. 280 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 535 F.2d 500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1000 (1976).
71. Id. at 287.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 287-88.
74. It is noteworthy that in support of its conclusion, the court in Niedermeyer relied on
Stanley F. Grabowski Trust ex rel. Grabowski v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 650 (1972). In
Grabowski, the redeemed shareholder's voting interest remained unchanged; both before and
after the redemption the taxpayer owned an 80.2% constructive voting interest. The court
stated: "The 80.2 percent constructive interest herein is one which dominates and controls
the policies of the company. This measure of control is sufficient to determine the payment
of dividends and to cause the redemption of stock .. " Id. at 659. Thus, implicit in
Niedermeyer's definition of control is an adoption of the simple majority stock ownership test
for determining the existence of control.
75. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 426 (1975). See also Furr v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 433
(1975) (related case).
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reduction in interest was not meaningful as defined in Davis, the
court focused on the issue of voting control.
The court observed that it had held reductions in interests
much greater than 1.7% not to be meaningful where the shareholder
was not deprived of his ability to control corporate activities.76 In the
instant case, the court found no such deprivation, since the taxpayer's voting control remained unchanged." The court also concluded that absent compliance with the test established in Himmel
v. Commissioner,7" which includes voting right changes as one of
three factors to be examined in determining dividend equivalence,"
the minimum conditions of Davis were not met. Since the taxpayer
had retained day-to-day control, the issue of the subjective
"meaningfulness" of the distribution was never reached.80
The analysis presented in the Fehrs-Niedmeyer-Furrtrilogy
supports the conclusion that the retained-control test is the proper
76. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 431; e.g., Fehrs Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 174 (1972),
aff'd 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974).
Conversely, a few rulings have held reductions in voting ownership
smaller than those
in Fehrs and Niedermeyer to be essentially equivalent to a dividend. E.g., Rev. Rul. 76-385,
1976-2 C.B. 92 (reduction from .000118% to .0001081% qualifies under § 302(b)(1)); Rev. Rul.
75-502, 1975-2 C.B. 111 (reduction from 57% to 50% meaningful because of potential deadlock). See also Private Letter Ruling 7827067 (reduction from 56.11% to 49.95% not essentially equivalent to a dividend).
Perhaps the most noted example of such a redemption appears in Rev. Rul. 76-364, 19762 C.B. 91. The ruling involved a corporation owned by four shareholders. The redeemed
shareholder owned 27% of the voting stock prior to the redemption. The remaining 73% was
owned equally by the remaining three shareholders. Thus, the taxpayer could exercise majority control by acting in concert with only one other shareholder. After the redemption, however, his interest was reduced to 22.27%. The Service ruled that the taxpayer had suffered
a meaningful reduction in his interest because he had to enlist the support of two other
shareholders to exercise majority control. See also Private Letter Ruling 7821145 (reduction
from 29.33% to 24.33% not essentially equivalent to a dividend); Private Letter Ruling
7814032 (reduction from 34.89% to 30.48%).
Revenue Ruling 76-364 has been described as probably the most outstanding example of
the control standard. Postlewaite & Finneran, supra note 19, at 584. The authors argue
that "[tlhe critical factor in the Service's opinion appears to have been a control element
not representing dominance or a majority but rather a minority block's annoyance or veto
power." Id. at 584.
The common thread running through these rulings is that after the redemption, the
redeemed shareholder owned 50% or less of the voting power. It is only after reaching this
conclusion that Rev. Ruls. 76-385 and 76-364 delved into the more difficult issue of determining the meaningfulness of the reduction.
77. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 431.
78. 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964).
79. For a discussion of the factors relevant in determining dividend equivalency, see note
20 supra.
80. Finding that the taxpayer had retained control, the court stated: "At what point a
distribution . . . might cause such a change in 'the basic rights of ownership' . . . as to cause
a meaningful reduction . . .we need not decide." 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 432.
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analytical tool for testing the dividend equivalency of redemptions
from majority shareholders in transactions which fail to reduce the
shareholder's voting ownership to 50% or less. Unlike the Benjamin type of redemption,' Category II cases involve actual reductions in voting stock ownership. Application of the relinquishedcontrol test of Wright and Rickey in this category would force a
court into the difficult position of rendering a subjective evaluation of fhe meaningfulness of a simple mathematical reduction in
stock ownership on a case-by-case basis. Absent a loss of day-to-day
control by the redeemed shareholder, the "retained-control" test
eliminates the need for this subjective inquiry. 2
C.

Category III: Simple Majority Control

Category III redemptions involve cases in which the taxpayer
actually or constructively owns more than half but less than twothirds of the corporate voting stock before and after the redemption.
Unfortunately, there is no case law dealing directly with such redemptions; Revenue Rulings 75-50211 and 77-21881 represent the primary authority in this area. It should be noted that the Service
relied heavily upon these two rulings in Revenue Ruling 78-401.
Revenue Ruling 75-502 involved a redemption of stock from one
of the three shareholders of X Corporation. Prior to the redemption,
A owned three-sevenths of the voting stock of X, B owned threesevenths, and an estate, of which A was the sole beneficiary, directly
owned the remaining one-seventh. X redeemed the entire actual
interest of the estate. As a result of the redemption, A's interest rose
to fifty percent which, by attribution, was constructively owned by
the estate.m Thus, the estate and B became coequal owners of X.
The estate claimed that the redemption was not essentially equivalent to a dividend and sought sale or exchange treatment under
section 302(b)(1).
Using the tripartite analysis established in Himmel, the Service
ruled in favor of the taxpayer. The pivotal factor in the ruling was
the lack of day-to-day control by the estate over the affairs of X. As
a result of the reduction of the interest of the estate to a constructive
50% block of voting shares, the only other unrelated shareholder's
81. Category I redemptions. See notes 57-64 and accompanying text supra.
82. See notes 41 & 47 supra. See also Rev. Rul. 73-2, 1973-2 C.B. 171 (100% before and
81% after equivalent to a dividend); Rev. Rul. 72-569, 1972-2 C.B. 203 (100% before and 85%
after equivalent to a dividend).
83. 1975-2 C.B. 111.
84. 1977-1 C.B. 81.
85. See I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(A).
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voting interest was increased to 50%. In effect, the redemption
had created the potential for a deadlock, so that the estate could
not unilaterally exercise control over the day-to-day affairs of X.
To help explain its position, the Service alluded to the impact that
a reduction of less than 7%would have produced in this instance.
If the stock of X held by the estate was reduced by less than 7
percentage points, the redemption would not qualify under section 302(b)(1) because the estate would continue to have domi-

nant voting rights in X by virtue of its ownership of more than
50 percent of the X stock.86

The analysis in Revenue Ruling 75-502 received added support
in Revenue Ruling 77-218, which involved a section 304(a)(1) redemption. The taxpayer, a trust, actually and constructively owned
60% of X and 75% of Y After Y's purchase of the taxpayer's X
shares, the taxpayers retained a constructive 55% interest in X.
Thus, the taxpayer suffered a net reduction of only 5% in his
voting interest. Significantly, the Service rested its rejection of
the taxpayer's claim to sale or exchange treatment in part on the
taxpayer's retained voting interest in excess of 50%. 7 Consequently, the taxpayer was treated as having received a section 301
distribution."
IV.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis demonstrates two consistent patterns.
First, regardless of the degree of control possessed by a majority
shareholder prior to a redemption, the single most important factor
in determining the applicability of section 302(b)(1) sale or exchange treatment is the retention or loss of control over day-to-day
corporate activities.8 Second, there appears to be no persuasive
reason for defining control other than in terms of those powers inherent in simple majority voting stock ownership. °

86. 1975-2 C.B. at 112. Revenue Ruling 75-502 has been viewed as one of the strongest
proponents of the retained-control test. See Postlewaite & Finneran, supra note 19, at 582 n.
108 (loss of technical control dispositive); Randall, supra note 19, at 260-61 (loss of control
most relevant factor). See also Private Letter Ruling 7933006 (meaningful reduction requires
loss of simple majority control).
87. 1977-1 C.B. at 82. The Service also listed two other grounds for its holding: (1) the
remaining stock was owned by shareholders related to the trust, and (2) A, who manages X
and Y, served as cotrustee of the trust. Id. For a brief discussion of Rev. Rul. 77-218, see
Postlewaite & Finneran, supra note 19, at 584.
88. I.R.C. § 301.
89. See note 76 supra.
90. See note 47 supra.
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It is extremely difficult to reconcile the Wright and Rickey
analyses with these two precepts. Indeed, the courts have consistently refused to attach any significance to a reduction merely in the
absolute number of shares owned by the redeemed shareholder. Instead, courts have focused their attention on the rights represented
by the percentage ownership of these shares. In instances where the
redeemed shareholder has retained ownership rights in the form of
day-to-day control over corporate activities, the courts have consistently denied sale or exchange treatment to such shareholders, regardless of the extent by which the shareholder's preredemption
interest exceeded simple majority status.
In Benjamin v. Commissioner," the Tax Court explicitly stated
that the attributes of control relevant in a section 302(b)(1) analysis
are the powers to determine the amount and timing of dividends
and redemptions, appoint officers and set their salaries, control the
board of directors, adopt a plan of liquidation, and authorize loans.
The majority shareholder in Revenue Ruling 78-401 retained most
if not all of these powers. The aspect of control actually relinquished
conferred no affirmative power on the minority shareholders.
Rather, the minority received only a veto power over those corporate
activities which, by definition, were unrelated to the day-to-day
activities of the corporation. 2 Viewed in this light, the relinquishedcontrol test of the Wright and Rickey decisions has little to support
it in case law, and less to commend it.
In sum, the retained-control test of Revenue Ruling 78-401 appears to be the better-reasoned analysis. This interpretation of the
Davis meaningful reduction test derives great support simply from
the fact that no post-Davis decision other than Wright or Rickey has
afforded sale or exchange treatment to a redeemed majority shareholder who retains day-to-day control over corporate affairs. Moreover, the use of the retained-control test in factual settings typified
by Wright eliminates one of the last areas of uncertainty still lingering in the section 302(b)(1) analytical framework. The loss of some
degree of flexibility inherent in the relinquished control test of
Wright and Rickey is certainly offset by the countervailing objectivity and predictability afforded by the retained-control test of Revenue Ruling 78-401.
91. 66 T.C. 1084, 1111 (1976), aff'd, 592 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Stanley F.
Grabowski Trust ex rel. Grabowski v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 650, 659 (1972) (control tantamount to ability to declare dividends and cause redemptions); notes 59, 64, 68 & 83-88 and
accompanying text supra.
92. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.

